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ANTITRUST IN TODAY'S WORLD ECONOMY
. Barry E. Hawk*
In discussing the proper role of antitrust in a world economy, it
is helpful to distinguish between the U.S. domestic economy (includ-
ing imports) and U.S. export trade and foreign investment. Both sides
of the equation have changed significantly in the last several decades.
Domestically, in 1950 the U.S. economy was largely isolated
from foreign competition, primarily as a result of tariffs and U.S. in-
dustrial preeminence after World War II. The U.S. was also rela-
tively less dependent on foreign capital, natural resources, and
technology. In this cushioned environment, antitrust laws were vigor-
ously enforced to promote domestic competition.' There was little
resort to trade laws to fight foreign competition, with the limited ex-
ception of section 337 2-used almost exclusively as an additional rem-
edy to block the importation of products infringing U.S. patents.
Today this picture is radically different. Through negotiations con-
ducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"),3 tariffs have been eliminated or substantially re-
duced for numerous goods. Imports now constitute an important, if
not essential, component of the U.S. economy in many sectors. Use of
the trade laws to protect against foreign competition has become stan-
dard in many industries.
There are other significant changed circumstances. Since 1958,
foreign antitrust enforcement has increased substantially, particularly
in Western Europe with the development of extensive enforcement
regimes in the European Economic Community ("EEC")4 and the
Federal Republic of Germany. There is also the increased role of
foreign governments and state-controlled enterprises in international
trade. Coincidentally and unrelated to the changed international pic-
ture is the revolutionary relaxation in U.S. domestic antitrust enforce-
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
See I B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust Law, ch. 1,
at 10-20 (2d ed. 1986).
2 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Part V, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
4 See 2 B. Hawk, supra note 1, at chs. 7-13.
5 See generally B5 K. Stockmann & V. Strauch, World Law of Competition (J. von Kali-
nowski ed. 1987).
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ment and rules in the last ten years.6
I. U.S. DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND IMPORTS
Two general questions concerning antitrust, as applied to the do-
mestic or import side of the equation, flow from these changed cir-
cumstances. First, how should U.S. antitrust analysis reflect this
increased foreign competition and the other changed circumstances?
Second, what effects on antitrust policy result from the increased re-
sort to trade laws and other "protectionist" measures?
A. Molding Antitrust Analysis to Reflect Increased Foreign
Competition and Other Changed Circumstances
The U.S. continues to have a national interest in remaining open
to imports, and a commitment to the use of the antitrust laws to pro-
tect import trade. The so-called "world economy"-or more accu-
rately, the increased interdependence of the U.S. economy and other
economies and the other international changes noted above-might
arguably require changes in antitrust jurisdictional and substantive
rules.
Against the background of changed circumstances, debates about
antitrust jurisdiction in international trade appear trivial-albeit intel-
lectually interesting and output-enhancing with respect to articles,
books, and weekend conferences in English stately homes. At least in
view of this conference's focus on the world economy, jurisidiction is
a sideshow pertaining mostly to conflicts with foreign governments
resulting from the application of U.S. antitrust laws. These conflicts
can be better avoided or resolved through bilateral agreements than
through unilateral disarming by the U.S. in amending the jurisdic-
tional reach of its antitrust laws. For example, the U.S.-Australian
Agreement 7 has done more to avoid and moderate antitrust disputes
between the two countries than any comity-based jurisidictional rule
created by the courts (for example, the Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America "balancing" test of the Ninth Circuit8). More im-
portant, the Administration's proposed amendments concerning juris-
diction and venue9 not only divert attention from more pressing issues
6 See Hawk, The American (Antitrust) Revolution: Lessons for the EEC?, Eur. Comp. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 1988).
7 Agreement on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No.
10365.
8 549 F.2d 597, 612-15 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
9 See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1987, S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (1987).
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and problems but also run some risk of weakening antitrust enforce-
ment with respect to international cartels that harm U.S. national in-
terests and U.S. consumer welfare.
How do the changed international circumstances affect substan-
tive antitrust rules and enforcement policy in domestic commerce?
First, increased U.S. dependence on foreign capital, technology, and
natural resources places a premium on antitrust protection of the U.S.
interest in low-cost efficient foreign supplies. The antitrust implica-
tions are: (1) continued strong enforcement against international and
foreign cartels that affect U.S. domestic markets, particularly restric-
tions on imports into the U.S., because foreign antitrust enforcement,
including that of the EEC, cannot be relied on to protect the U.S.
against international cartels, as EEC enforcement is limited to cartels
that harm the EEC; (2) the need for foreign investment into the U.S.
requires sensitive application of merger and joint venture rules in or-
der not to inhibit foreign entry and participation in U.S. markets; (3)
antitrust rules on patent and know-how transfers must not deter or
prevent U.S. access to foreign technology; (4) strict antitrust enforce-
ment against export cartels must continue, despite the uncomfortable
"beggar thy neighbor" policy of the U.S. in promoting its own export
cartels.' ° A possible solution to mutually harmful export cartels
might be for all countries (both the donors and the recipients of ex-
port cartels) to permit under their antitrust laws, only efficiency-en-
hancing export arrangements, on the rationale that both the exporting
and importing nation would benefit. I
Second, market analysis in antitrust cases must give greater
weight and recognition to foreign competition. As Don Baker illus-
trated, this issue is usually seen most clearly in merger decisions with
respect to geographic market definition.'" But the same issue also
arises in connection with section 2 claims, rule of reason cases under
section 1, and vertical restraint cases under section 3 of the Clayton
Act. All require market analysis and market definition.
Third, the question arises whether the per se rule should give
way to the rule of reason in international cases. This misstates the
issue and is of diminishing practical importance given the narrowing
10 Antitrust law exemptions for certain export cartels and other arrangements among per-
sons engaged in U.S. export trade are contained in the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982)) and the Webb-
Pomerene Act, ch. 50, 40 Stat. 516 (1918) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982)).
1 This solution fails to take into account, however, other policy considerations such as
employment and development of local industries.
12 See Baker, The Proper Role for Antitrust in a Not-Yet-Global Economy, 9 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1135 (1988).
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of the kinds of arrangements subject to the per se prohibition. There
are differences, however, when applying the rule of reason to a case
involving foreign competition. Factual issues concerning market
power and market definition may be more complicated, and courts
should not blindly apply precedent developed in a purely domestic
context. Additional justifications may exist where there is a foreign
supplier.
A net national welfare standard, 3 rather than the domestic con-
sumer welfare standard, might be more appropriate in the interna-
tional context. In a closed economy, the primary if not exclusive
antitrust policy objective is consumer welfare or allocative efficiency.
In an economy open to imports and foreign competition, the antitrust
policy objective might be a net national welfare standard which aggre-
gates the citizens' consumer surplus and the profits of domestic firms
earned in their domestic and export operations. The national interest
from this point of view is concerned more with the relative terms and
conditions of trade than with the volume of exports. 4 A net national
welfare standard would have several antitrust policy implications.
Export cartels and vertical restraints imposed on foreign resellers that
increase profits of U.S. exporters without a tradeoff loss in U.S. con-
sumer welfare (for example, through higher prices or reduced output
in U.S. markets) might receive more lenient treatment under a net
national welfare standard. Such a standard could well invite retalia-
tion by trading partners, however, and ultimately prove counter-
productive.
Fourth, the increasing role of foreign governments and state en-
terprises in U.S. domestic and international trade has several implica-
tions for antitrust policy. Differences in the competitive conditions in
U.S. and foreign markets may require changes in traditional substan-
tive rules. For example, predatory pricing tests should differ where
the alleged predator is a foreign company. Predation by foreign firms
raises different issues. To cite only one example, most of the cost-
based rules for predatory pricing by domestic or U.S.-based firms rest
on efficiency grounds.'" Widely differing governmental policies and
trading conditions in various countries make it uncertain whether the
same efficiency judgments can be made in the case of a foreign
13 For a discussion of net national welfare standards and recent developments in the inter-
national trade literature, see Ordover, Transnational Antitrust and Economics, in 1984 Ford-
ham Corp. L. Inst. 233 (B. Hawk ed. 1985).
14 See 1 B. Hawk, supra note 1, at 2-3.
15 See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983);
Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
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predator. Strategic considerations are probably more important with
respect to foreign predation of U.S. firms in U.S. markets.16 It is un-
fortunate that the Court, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp. ,"' failed to focus on the differences between for-
eign and domestic predators and simply relied on literature pessimis-
tic about the likelihood of domestic predation.' 8
The increased frequency and complexity of dealings between
private firms and foreign governments require rethinking and perhaps
reformulation of the doctrines and defenses applicable in the interna-
tional antitrust area-foreign government subsidization as an anti-
trust violation and the antitrust liability of private firms for con-
duct and agreements encouraged but not compelled by foreign
governments. '9
B. Trade Laws and Protectionist Measures
Affecting Antitrust Policy
The second general issue on the domestic or the import side con-
cerns the effects on antitrust policy resulting from the increased resort
to trade laws and other "protectionist" measures. This question de-
volves into two further questions: First, how do we resolve the ten-
sions, if not conflicts, between antitrust policy and trade law or
protectionist policy? It is well beyond the scope of these brief com-
ments even to begin to discuss this problem. Suffice it to say that
more fundamental questions must be addressed before confident con-
clusions can be drawn about the 'elationship between antitrust and
trade policy. For example, one must first ask questions concerning the
U.S. national interest in imports and foreign competition and the role
of antitrust in furthering that interest, and whether it is possible to
distinguish among U.S. industries and sectors with respect to open or
protected competition.
Second, how should the antitrust laws take into account the
trade laws? As Harvey Applebaum has discussed this question,2" I
shall simply make several points. First, misuse of the trade laws will
be alleged more frequently as an antitrust violation. Second, a greater
effort should be made to harmonize antitrust and trade law standards
where possible under the statutes-for example, tests for predatory
16 See I B. Hawk, supra note 1, ch. 4, at 340-50.
17 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
18 Id. at 1357-58.
19 See I B. Hawk, supra note 1, at ch. 5.
20 See Applebaum, The Coexistence of Antitrust Law and Trade Law with Antitrust Pol-
icy, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1169 (1988).
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pricing and dumping. Third, the trade laws and resort to protection-
ist measures should be taken into account in the antitrust analysis.
Thus, as Don Baker so eloquently argued, merger analysis must re-
flect the trade laws' and protectionist measures' effects on actual and
potential foreign competition.2 I am not as pessimistic or critical as
Don about the Justice Department Merger Guidelines' treatment of
foreign competition. I think the Guidelines do provide substantial
guidance in a highly complex, fact-specific area.22 On a lighter side, I
must assume that Don is joking when he suggests that political scien-
tists should be expert witnesses in merger litigation on issues of for-
eign competition and prospective protectionist measures. 23  My
assumption that this is not a serious suggestion rests on two grounds.
First, I agree that there are political dimensions to the analysis of the
effect of imports and foreign competition in defining relevant markets
and otherwise assessing the domestic competitive situation. I am less
confident, however, that these political factors can either be translated
into operable legal rules or even used successfully in the adversarial
setting of antitrust litigation. Second, I have no confidence whatso-
ever that political science can add anything but confusion and obfus-
cation to the determination or speculation about future changes in
trade legislation, enforcement, and litigation.
II. U.S. EXPORT TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Let me turn now to the second side of the equation-U.S. ex-
ports and outward investment. Despite occasional cries to the con-
trary, the issue of the antitrust laws' adverse effect on U.S. exports
and foreign investment is no longer viable, if it ever was. 24 The juris-
dictional amendments to the Sherman Act in 1982,25 and the applica-
tion of permissive substantive rules to joint ventures and vertical
restraints make this a largely dead issue or, at the least, make it evi-
dent that the antitrust laws are cast as the scapegoat for failures in
U.S. export performance.
There are several issues and subjects in the export area that are
more important than the adverse-impact canard. First, should fore-
closure of other exporters or of export trade be a sufficient condition
for liability, or is proof of anticompetitive effects in the U.S. re-
21 See Baker, supra note 12, at 1144.
22 U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,827 (1984).
23 See Baker, supra note 12, at 1158.
24 See, e.g., I B. Hawk, supra note 1, ch. 1, at 15-20.
25 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
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quired?26 The case law is unclear and it will be useful to have the
Justice Department's opinion in the revised international guidelines.
Second, foreclosure in export cases should be measured in light of two
factors: the share of the industry's export market relative to its U.S.
market and the share of the export market preempted or foreclosed by
the challenged export arrangement. In many cases, foreclosure
should be measured by taking into account all foreign markets avail-
able to U.S. exporters. Third, the policy tension between protection
of competition and protection of competitors is particularly acute
with respect to restrictions in export commerce. Relevant economic
theory is far less developed with respect to international trade. For
example, a mere increase in export volume may be less beneficial to
U.S. net national welfare than the relative terms and conditions of
trade. Domestic antitrust standards are not necessarily appropriate.
Thus, effects on export volume should not be equated with output
effects which are an important consideration in domestic cases under
the rule of reason.
26 See I B. Hawk, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 165-71.
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